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Abstract
We develop a novel approximate Bayesian
computation (ABC) framework, ABCDP,
that obeys the notion of differential privacy
(DP). Under our framework, simply perform-
ing ABC inference with a mild modification
yields differentially private posterior samples.
We theoretically analyze the interplay between
the ABC similarity threshold abc (for com-
paring the similarity between real and sim-
ulated data) and the resulting privacy level
dp of the posterior samples, in two types of
frequently-used ABC algorithms. We apply
ABCDP to simulated data as well as privacy-
sensitive real data. The results suggest that
tuning the similarity threshold abc helps us
obtain better privacy and accuracy trade-off.
1. Introduction
Approximate Bayesian computation (ABC) aims at
identifying the posterior distribution over simulator
parameters. The posterior distribution is of interest
as it provides the mechanistic understanding of the
stochastic procedure that directly generates data in
many areas such as climate and weather, ecology,
cosmology, and bioinformatics (Tavaré et al., 1997;
Ratmann et al., 2007; Bazin et al., 2010; Schafer and
Freeman, 2012). Under these complex models, directly
evaluating the likelihood of data given the parameters
is often intractable. ABC resorts to an approximation
of the likelihood function using simulated data that
are similar to the actual observations.
In the simplest form of ABC called rejection ABC,
we proceed by sampling multiple model parameters
from a prior distribution pi: θ1, θ2, . . . ∼ pi. For each
θi, a pseudo dataset Yi is generated from a simulator
(the forward sampler associated with the intractable
likelihood p(y|θ)). The parameter θi for which the
generated Yi are similar to the observed Y ∗, as de-
cided by ρ(Yi, Y ∗) < abc, are accepted. Here ρ is a
notion of distance, for instance, L2 distance beween
Yt and Y ∗ in terms of a pre-chosen summary statistic.
Whether the distance is small or large is determined
by abc, a similarity threshold. The result is samples
{θi}Mi=1 from a distribution, p˜(θ|Y ∗) ∝ pi(θ)p˜(Y ∗|θ),
where p˜(Y ∗|θ) =
∫
B(Y ∗)
p(Y |θ)dY and B (Y ∗) =
{y : ρ(Y, Y ∗) < abc}. As the likelihood computation
is approximate, so is the posterior distribution. Hence,
this framework is named by “approximate Bayesian
computation.”
Most ABC algorithms evaluate the data similar-
ity in terms of summary statistics computed by an
aggregation of individual datapoints (Joyce and Mar-
joram, 2008; Robert et al., 2011; Nunes and Bald-
ing, 2010; Aeschbacher et al., 2012; Drovandi et al.,
2015; Aeschbacher et al., 2012; Fearnhead and Pran-
gle, 2012). However, this seemingly innocuous step
of similarity check could impose a privacy threat, as
aggregated statistics could still reveal an individual’s
participation to the dataset with the help of combin-
ing other publicly available datasets (see Homer et al.
(2008); Johnson and Shmatikov (2013)). In addition,
in some studies, the actual observations are privacy-
sensitive in nature e.g., Genotype data for estimating
Tuberculosis transmission parameters (Tanaka et al.,
2006). Hence, there is in dire need of privatization in
the step of similarity check in ABC algorithms.
In this light, we introduce an ABC framework that
obeys the notion of differential privacy. The differen-
tial privacy definition provides a way to quantify the
amount of information that the distance computed
on the privacy-sensitive data contains on whether or
not a single individual’s data is included (or modified)
in the data (Dwork et al., 2006b). Differential pri-
vacy also provides rigorous privacy guarantees in the
presence of arbitrary side information such as similar
public data available.
A common form of applying DP to an algorithm is
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by adding noise to outputs of the algorithm. In case
of ABC, our theoretical results suggest that adding
noise to the distance computed on the real observa-
tions and pseudo-data suffices the privacy guarantee
of the resulting posterior samples. Besides, unlike
other algorithms, ABC has a special parameter, the
similarity threshold parameter, abc. What is the pre-
cise relationship between abc and the final privacy
level of the posterior samples? To date, the answer
to this question is not well understood. Intuitively,
one expects that the smaller the threshold abc, the
closer the distance between the posterior samples to
the true parameters that generated the real observa-
tions, implying the resulting posterior samples are less
private. On the other hand, the larger the threshold
abc, the farther the distance from the posterior sam-
ples to the true parameters, implying the posterior
samples are more private. How could we formalize
this intuition and formulate an ABC framework with
a DP guarantee (ABCDP)? This is precisely a thesis
of this work.
Furthermore, ABC inference requires a repeated use
of sensitive data to compare the similarity for a new
candidate dataset, which imposes an additional chal-
lenge in terms of privacy. The composition property
of differential privacy states that the privacy level
degrades over a repeated use of data. To overcome
this challenge, we adopt a recently developed notion
of privacy called Renyi differential privacy (RDP) in
order to obtain the smallest cumulative privacy loss af-
ter many repeated use of data (Mironov, 2017; Abadi
et al., 2016; Wang et al., 2019).
Putting together, we conclude our introduction by
summarizing our main contributions:
1. We provide two novel ABC frameworks: rejection-
ABC and soft-thresholding-ABC. We take into
account the intuition that the similarity thresh-
old abc could be used for introducing a privacy
guarantee in the posterior samples. The resulting
ABCDP frameworks can improve the trade-off
between privacy and accuracy of the posterior
samples, as the privacy loss under ABCDP is a
function of the similarity threshold abc as well
as the level of injected noise for privacy.
2. We provide a tight privacy analysis using
the Renyi differential privacy for our soft-
thresholding ABCDP framework. This analysis
results in a very small cumulative privacy loss af-
ter a repeated use of data, compared to the pure
 guarantee we have in our rejection-ABCDP
framework.
3. We validate our theory in both frameworks in
the experiments using simulated data as well as
a privacy-sensitive real-world dataset.
2. Background
We start by describing some relevant background in-
formation.
2.1. Approximate Bayesian Computation
Given a set Y ∗ containing observations, rejection
ABC (Bazin et al., 2010) yields samples from an
approximate posterior distribution by repeating the
following three steps:
θ ∼ pi(θ), (1)
Y = {y1, y2, . . .} ∼ p(y|θ), (2)
pabc(θ|Y ∗) ∼ pabc(Y ∗|θ)pi(θ), (3)
where the pseudo dataset Y is compared with the
observations Y ∗ via
pabc(Y
∗|θ) =
∫
Babc (Y
∗)
p(Y |θ)dY, (4)
Babc(Y
∗) = {y|ρ(Y, Y ∗) ≤ abc}, (5)
where ρ is a divergence measure between two datasets,
and is often defined as a distance between the sum-
mary statistics of the two datasets i.e., ρ(Y, Y ∗) =
D(S(Y ), S(Y ∗)), with some distance measure D on
the statistics computed by S.
In soft-thresholding ABC (soft-ABC), on the
other hand, parameter samples from the prior are
weighted rather than accepted or rejected. An algo-
rithm in this family is K2-ABC (Park et al., 2016)
where the weight for each sampled parameter θj
is given by wj =
κ(Yj ,Y
∗)∑M
l=1 κ(Yl,Y
∗) , and κ(Y, Y
′) =
exp
(
−ρq(Y,Y ′)abc
)
, for q > 0. Given a set of ob-
servations Y ∗, K2-ABC yields weighted samples
{(θj , wj)}Mj=1. One can directly use these for esti-
mating posterior expectations: given a function f ,
the expectation
∫
Θ
f(θ)p(θ|y∗)dθ is estimated using
Eˆ[f(θ)] =
∑M
i=1 wjf(θj).
While any divergence metric can be used for ρ in the
soft-ABC framework, K2-ABC uses Maximum Mean
Discrepancy (MMD, Gretton et al. (2012)), and we
will also use MMD in some part of our experiments.
MMD is described below.
Maximum Mean Discrepancy Assume that the
data Y ⊂ X and let k : X × X be a positive definite
kernel. The MMD between two distributions P,Q is
defined as
MMD(P,Q) : =
(Ex,x′∼P k(x, x′) + Ey,y′∼Qk(y, y′)
− 2Ex∼PEy∼Qk(x, y)) 12 . (6)
2
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The Moore–Aronszajn theorem states that there is
a unique Hilbert space H on which k defines an in-
ner product. As a result, there exists a feature map
φ : X → H such that k(x, y) = 〈φ(x), φ(y)〉H, where
〈·, ·〉H = 〈·, ·〉 denotes the inner product on H. The
MMD in eq. 6 can be written as
MMD(P,Q) =
∥∥Ex∼P [φ(x)]− Ey∼Q[φ(y)]∥∥H,
where Ex∼P [φ(x)] ∈ H is known as the (kernel) mean
embedding of P , and exists if Ex∼P
√
k(x, x) < ∞
(Smola et al., 2007). The MMD can thus be inter-
preted as the distance between the mean embeddings
of the two distributions. If k is a characteristic kernel
(Sriperumbudur et al., 2011), then P 7→ Ex∼P [φ(x)]
is injective, and MMD forms a metric, implying that
MMD(P,Q) = 0, if and only if P = Q.
Unlike a pre-chosen finite dimensional summary
statistic typically used in ABC literature, MMD com-
pares two distributions in terms of all the possible
moments of the the random variables described by the
two distributions. Hence, in theory, ABC frameworks
using the MMD metric such as K2-ABC can avoid
the problem of non-sufficiency of a chosen summary
statistic that may incur in many ABC methods.
When P,Q are observed through samples Xm =
{xi}mi=1 ∼ P and Yn = {yi}ni=1 (as is the case in
practice), eq. 6 can be estimated by simply replacing
the population expectations with empirical averages
(Gretton et al., 2012, eq. 3):
M̂MD(Xm, Yn) = (
1
m2
m∑
i,j=1
k(xi, xj) +
1
n2
n∑
i,j=1
k(yi, yj)
− 2mn
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
k(xi, yj))
1
2 .
When applied in the ABC setting, one input set to
M̂MD is Y ∗ and the other is a pseudo dataset Yt ∼
p(·|θt) generated from the simulator, for some θt ∼
pi(θ). Note that the total computational cost of the
estimator M̂MD(Xm, Yn) is O(Tmn) for the T number
of posterior samples. To reduce the complexity, sub-
quadratic time MMD estimators exist e.g., an unbiased
linear-time estimator (Gretton et al., 2012, Section 6).
See Appendix Sec. C for MMD with random Fourier
features (Rahimi and Recht, 2008) for another linear-
time estimator.
2.2. Differential Privacy
An output from an algorithm that takes in sensitive
data as input will naturally contain some information
of the sensitive data D. The goal of differential pri-
vacy is to augment such an algorithm so that useful
information about the population is retained, while
sensitive information such as an individual’s partici-
pation in the dataset cannot be learned (Dwork and
Roth, 2014). A common way to achieve these two
seemingly paradoxical goals is by deliberately inject-
ing a controlled-level of random noise to the to-be-
released quantity. The modified procedure, known as
a DP mechanism, now gives a stochastic output due to
the injected noise. In the DP framework, higher level
of noise provides stronger privacy guarantee at the
expense of less accurate population-level information
that can be derived from the released quantity. Less
noise added to the output thus reveals more about an
individual’s presence in the dataset.
More formally, given a mechanism M and neigh-
bouring datasets D, D′ differing by a single entry, the
privacy loss of an outcome o is defined by
L(o) = log
P (M(D) = o)
P (M(D′) = o) . (7)
The mechanismM is called -DP if and only if
|L(o)| ≤  (8)
for all possible outcomes o and for all possible neigh-
bouring datasets D,D′. A weaker version of the above
notion is (, δ)-DP:M is (, δ)-DP if |L(o)| ≤ , with
probability at least 1− δ. The definition states that a
single individual’s participation in the data does not
change the output probabilities by much; this limits
the amount of information that the algorithm reveals
about any one individual.
A differentially private algorithm is designed by
adding noise to the algorithms’ outputs. Suppose a
deterministic function h : D 7→ Rp computed on sensi-
tive data D outputs a p-dimensional vector quantity.
In order to make h private, we can add noise to the
output of h, where the level of noise is calibrated to
the global sensitivity (Dwork et al., 2006a), ∆h, de-
fined by the maximum difference in terms of some
norm ||h(D)− h(D′)|| for neighboring D and D′ (i.e.
differ by one data sample). For the Gaussian mecha-
nism (Theorem 3.22 in Dwork and Roth (2014)), the
perturbed output is given by
h˜(D) = h(D) +N (0, σ2Ip).
The perturbed function h˜(D) is then (, δ)-DP, where
σ ≥ ∆h
√
2 log(1.25/δ)/, for  ∈ (0, 1) and ∆h uses
L2 norm, ||h(D)−h(D′)||2. (See the proof of Theorem
3.22 in Dwork and Roth (2014) for more details).
There are two important properties of differential
privacy that we will use in this work. The compos-
ability theorem (Dwork et al., 2006a) states that the
strength of privacy guarantee degrades with repeated
use of DP-algorithms. Formally, given an (1, δ1)-
DP mechanism M1 and an (2, δ2)-DP mechanism
M2, the mechanism M(D) := (M1(D),M2(D)) is
3
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(1 + 2, δ1 + δ2)-DP. This composition is often-called
linear composition, as the parameters are simply lin-
early summed up. Furthermore, the post-processing
invariance property (Dwork et al., 2006a) tells us that
the composition of any arbitrary data-independent
mapping with an (, δ)-DP algorithm is also (, δ)-DP.
2.3. Rényi Differential Privacy
ABC algorithms are iterative in nature, and the simple
linear composition would result in a high cumulative
privacy loss. For a more refined calculation of cumula-
tive privacy loss, we use the recently developed notion
of privacy called Rényi Differential Privacy (RDP)
(Mironov, 2017). As introduced below, RDP takes
an expectation over the outcomes of the DP mech-
anism, rather than taking a single worst case as in
pure DP (eq. 8). Hence, the upper bound in RDP is
significantly smaller than the linear sum of worst cases
in the pure DP case, resulting in a greatly reduced
cumulative privacy loss for a repeated use of data.
Definition 2.1 ((α, )-RDP). A mechanism is called
 Renyi differentially private with an order α if for all
neighbouring datasets D,D′,
Dα(M(D)||M(D′)) ≤ , (9)
where Dα denotes α-Rényi Divergence.
Dα(P ||Q) is defined below.
Definition 2.2 (α-Rényi Divergence). For two prob-
ability distributions P,Q that have the same support,
the α Rényi divergence is
Dα(P ||Q) = 1
α− 1 logEx∼Q(x)
(
P (x)
Q(x)
)α
(10)
for α ∈ (1,∞).
For instance, a frequently used DP mechanism is
Gaussian mechanism, which also satisfies the RDP
notion as below:
Corollary 2.1 (Gaussian mechanism). As
Dα(N (τ, σ2)||N (µ, σ2)) = α||τ−µ||
2
2
2σ2 , the Gaus-
sian mechanism satisfies (α, α||τ−µ||
2
2
2σ2 )-RDP.
The repeated use of adaptive RDP mechanisms
composes by the Theorem below:
Theorem 2.2 (Composition of adaptive RDP mech-
anisms). Let f : D 7→ R1 be (α, 1)-RDP. Let g :
R1 ×D 7→ R2 be (α, 2)-RDP. Then, the mechanism
releasing (X,Y ), where X ∼ f(D) and Y ∼ g(D, X)
satisfies (α, 1 + 2)-RDP.
Once we compute the cumulative privacy loss using
the RDP composition, we convert the RDP notion to
the original definition of DP by the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 1. [From RDP to DP (Mironov, 2017)
IfM is a (α, )-RDP mechanism, then it also satisfies(
+ log 1/δα−1 , δ
)
-DP for any 0 < δ < 1.
3. Proposal: ABCDP
Here we present our ABCDP framework. We first
describe the privacy setup we consider in this paper,
then describe our algorithms.
3.1. Problem Setup
Suppose there is a data owner who owns valuable
but sensitive data Y ∗ and is willing to contribute to
the posterior inference. Suppose there is a modeler,
whose aim is to identify the posterior distribution of
the parameters of a simulator, which can well model
the data.
We frame the ABCDP algorithm to be performed
in the following two steps: (Step 1: non-private)
the modeler draws a parameter sample θt from a prior
pi(θ) at t = 1, · · · , T . The modeler then runs a p(y|θ)
with θ = θt to obtain a pseudo dataset Yt. We assume
that the the samples {θt} from the prior and also the
pseudo-data {Yt} from the simulator given {θt} are
all public information (i.e., these are accessible by
anyone including an adversary). (Step 2: private):
the data owner takes {(θt, Yt)}Tt=1 and outputs either
a set of binary indicators determining whether each
Yt is similar to Y ∗ (i.e., accept θt or not) in the case
of rejection ABC or a vector of continuous weights
representing the degree of similarity to Y ∗ in the case
of soft ABC.
In either case, the data owner applies our proposed
DP mechanism to the output (Section 3.2 for rejection
ABC, and Section 3.3 for soft ABC) to guarantee the
privacy on the sensitive data.
3.2. Proposed Mechanism for Rejection ABC
The first framework we introduce is a rejection ABC
framework with a differentially private distance.
Definition 3.1 (Mrej : DP mechanism for one-step
rejection ABC). Given a dataset Y ∗, a pseudo-data
sample Yt, noise variance σrej, ABC rejection thresh-
old abc, and a distance ρ, the mechanismMrej out-
puts a stochastic binary indicator given by
Mrej(Y ∗, Yt, abc, σrej) = I
[
D˜(Y ∗, Yt) ≤ abc
]
:= τt,
4
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Algorithm 1 Proposed rejection ABCDP algorithm
Input: Observations Y ∗, posterior sample size T ,
ABC threshold abc, tolerable total privacy loss
total, ABC distance ρ, and {(θt, Yt)}Tt=1
Output: total-DP binary indicators {τt}Tt=1 for cor-
responding samples {θt}Tt=1 where τt ∈ {0, 1}
1: Per-step privary loss  = total/T
2: Noise variance σrej = h−1(). See Theorem 3.1.
3: for t = 1, . . . , T do
4: Draw noise nt ∼ N (0, σ2rej)
5: τt = I[ρ(Y
∗, Yt) + nt ≤ abc]
6: end for
where D˜(Y ∗, Yt) = ρ(Y ∗, Yt) + nt, and nt is i.i.d.
drawn from N (0, σ2rej).
Given a level of privacy loss  that the data owner
can tolerate, the noise variance σ2rej can be chosen so
as to guarantee thatMrej is -DP. This is formally
stated in Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 3.1 (Mrej is -DP). For any neighbour-
ing datasets X,X ′ of size N and any dataset Y , as-
sume that ρ is such that 0 < sup(X,X′),Y |ρ(X,Y ) −
ρ(X ′, Y )| ≤ ∆ρ < ∞. Assume that ρ is bounded by
Bρ i.e., 0 < supX,Y ρ(X,Y ) ≤ Bρ < ∞ where X,Y
are datasets of any size. Consider the mechanism
Mrej defined in Def. 3.1. Define
h(σ) = min
(
1,
∆ρ√
2piσ2
) [
Φ
(
min(abc−Bρ,−abc)
σ
)]−1
,
(11)
where Φ is the CDF of the standard normal. Given an
, choose σrej = h−1() where h−1 is the inverse of h.
Then, the mechanism is -DP where  = h(σrej).
A proof is given in Appendix Sec. A. Note that the
function h(σ) is strictly decreasing on (0,∞) and has a
well-defined inverse h−1. Thus, given a desired bound
on privacy loss , we can efficiently find the right noise
variance σ such that  = h(σ) with binary search. In
general, the upper bound ∆ρ depends on the sample
size. If |Y ∗| = N and ρ(X,Y ) = M̂MD(X,Y ) with
a bounded kernel, then ∆ρ = O(1/N) as shown in
Lemma 3.1.
Lemma 3.1 (∆ρ = O(1/N) for MMD). Assume that
Y ∗ and each pseudo dataset Yt are of the same cardi-
nality N . Set ρ(X,Y ) = M̂MD(X,Y ) with a kernel k
bounded by Bk > 0 i.e., supx,y∈X k(x, y) ≤ Bk < ∞.
Then,
sup
(X,X′),Y
|ρ(X,Y )− ρ(X ′, Y )| ≤ ∆ρ = 2
N
√
Bk (12)
and supX,Y ρ(X,Y ) ≤ Bρ = 2
√
Bk.
Algorithm 2 Proposed soft ABCDP algorithm
Input: Observations Y ∗, posterior sample size T ,
ABC threshold abc, tolerable total privacy loss
(total, δtotal), ABC distance ρ and {(θt, Yt)}Tt=1
Output: (total, δtotal)-DP weights {ωt}Tt=1 for corre-
sponding samples {θt}Tt=1
Compute σsoft by eq. 16
for t = 1, . . . , T do
ω˜t = exp
(
−D˜(y∗, yt)
)
where D˜(y∗, yt) is in
eq. 14
end for
ωt =
ω˜t∑
j ω˜j
, for all t = 1, · · · , T
A proof is given in Appendix Sec. B.
With the result in Lemma 3.1, the func-
tion h in Theorem 3.1 is given by h(σ) :=
min
(
1, 2N
√
Bk
2piσ2
)[
Φ
(
1
σ min (abc −Bρ,−abc)
)]−1.
Note that limN→∞ h(σ) = 0 for any σ > 0. This
means that as the size of the sensitive data Y ∗
grows larger, we need smaller perturbation (i.e.,
smaller σrej) to the true output to guarantee the
same privacy loss. For ρ = M̂MD using a Gaussian
kernel, k(x, y) = exp
(
−‖x−y‖22ν2
)
where ν > 0 is the
bandwidth of the kernel, Bk = 1 for any ν > 0.
In practice, the mechanismMrej will be executed T
times where T is the number of queries. To guarantee
that the total privacy loss is no larger than total, it is
sufficient to set the one-step privacy loss  = total/T ,
due to the linear composition. The full algorithm is
shown in Algorithm 1
3.3. Proposed Mechanism for Soft ABC
Now we present a DP mechanism, in which privacy
analysis nicely identifies the relationship between the
ABC similarity threshold and the privacy level. We
propose a mechanism for releasing soft-ABC weight
differentially privately. First, we define the mechanism.
Definition 3.2 (The ABC weight mechanism for
one-step soft ABC). Given a dataset Y ∗, a pseudo-
data sample Yt, ABC soft threshold ABC , privacy
parameter σ and features φ, the Soft-ABC weight
mechanismMSoftWeight : (Y ∗, Y t, abc, σ) 7→ − log ω˜t
is defined by
MSoftWeight(Y ∗, Y t, abc, σsoft) = D˜(Y ∗, Yt) (13)
where the noisy distance is defined by
D˜(Y ∗, Yt) = Dt + nt, (14)
5
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Dt :=
1
abc
ρ(Y ∗, Yt), and the noise nt is i.i.d. drawn
from N (0, σ2soft).
Note that when the computed noisy distance is
negative, we project back to a small positive number
so that the resulting weight (after exponentiation. See
Algorithm 2) does not dominate other weights. This
extra step does not alter the DP guarantee that we
provide due to the post-processing invariance of DP.
Now we formally state that the proposed mechanism
is RDP and also DP in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2. The Soft-ABC weight mechanism de-
fined in Def. 3.2 is (α, )-RDP, where
 =
α∆2ρ
2σ2soft
2
abc
(15)
and ∆ρ is the L2-sensitivity of ρ.
A proof is given in Appendix Sec. D.
Remark. In Thm. 3.2, we can clearly see the interplay
between the amount of noise σabc added for privacy
and the soft threshold abc. With a fixed amount of
noise σsoft, the smaller the similarity threshold abc,
the larger the privacy loss . This is well aligned with
our intuition that a smaller similarity threshold would
encourage the resulting posterior sample to be closer
to what the true data support, hence that posterior
sample reveals more about the true data (less private,
hence more privacy loss, i.e., higher ). On the other
hand, with a fixed amount of noise σsoft, the larger
the similarity threshold abc, the smaller the privacy
loss . In this case, the mean of perturbed distance
gets smaller, resulting in many weights being large
and the similar to each other(i.e.,from ωt = exp(−D˜)),
– at this point, the distance matters less – which forces
taking more samples from the prior, i.e., the weights
and weighted posterior samples become more private
(i.e., becoming irrelevant to the data). With a fixed
abc, the larger the noise σabc, the more private the
weights, as the distance gets noisier, and hence the
resulting  (privacy loss) becomes small.
In practice, to obtain an appropriate amount of
noise to add to ρ in each sampling step, we convert
the RDP level (-RDP) to match the desired DP level
(total, δtotal)-DP due to Prop. 1
total ≥ + log(1/δtotal)
α− 1 . (16)
3.4. Privacy Analysis for Soft-ABCDP
Now we also formally state that the proposed algo-
rithm is differentially private in the following theorem.
1
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(a) True parameters
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(b) Observations
Figure 1: Toy example. (a): 5-dimensional true
parameters. (b): Observations sampled from the
mixture of uniform distributions in eq. 17 with the
true parameters.
1 0 − 3 1 0 − 2 1 0 − 1
epsilon_abc
1 0 − 2
1 0 − 1
M
SE
eps_total = 1
eps_total = 2
eps_total = 4
eps_total = 6
eps_total = 8
nonpriv
Figure 2: Soft ABCDP on Toy example. Mean-
squared error (between true parameters and posterior
mean) vs similarity threshold abc. (results are from
10 independent runs). Non-private soft-ABC, i.e., K2-
ABC (Park et al., 2016) (black solid trace) achieved
the smallest MSE when abc = 0.005. On the other
hand, when abc = 0.01, twice larger than the non-
private optimal, most soft ABCDP methods achieved
the smallest MSE. Larger abc helps reducing the per-
step noise variance due to eq. 15. However, too large
abc deteriorates the performance of ABC as it puts
equal weights on all prior samples.
Theorem 3.3. Algorithm 2 is (α, ′(α))-Renyi dif-
ferentially private, where ′(α) = T = α∆
2
ρT
2σ2soft
2
abc
.
Algorithm 2 also satisfies
(
′(α) + log 1/δα−1 , δ
)
for any
0 < δ < 0.
A proof follows the composition theorem of RDP
given in Thm. 2.2 and the proposition converting RDP
to DP given in Prop. 1.
To find the smallest σsoft and an optimal α that
satisfy eq. 16, we use the numerical tool1 published
by Wang et al. (2019).
1https://github.com/yuxiangw/autodp. This tool is writ-
ten in terms of the privacy parameter σ (equivalent to the
noise standard deviation in the mechanism assuming the L2
sensitivity is 1). Hence, we compute how much noise we need to
add in each t by σsoft = σS, where σ is the privacy parameter
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Figure 3: Rejection ABCDP on Toy example. Mean-squared error (between true parameters and posterior
mean) vs similarity threshold abc (results are from 10 independent runs). Left: Non-private rejection ABC,
i.e., K2-ABC (Park et al., 2016) at different values of abc. The smallest abc achieved the smallest MSE (black
trace). Note that MSE is constant across total as this is a non-private version. Middle: Fixing Bρ to top 5
percentile of the distances ρ(Yt, Yt′) computed on simulated data. Because we aggressively clip the distance ρ
with this relatively small Bρ, most of the distances after clipping is Bρ and the remaining distances smaller
than Bρ is very scarce. Applying noise to these clipped distances and then applying a small value of abc to the
noisy distances deteriorate the performance of ABCDP. In such case, ABCDP with larger abc (blue dotted
trace) performed slightly better. Right: Fixing Bρ to top 20 percentile of the distances ρ(Yt, Yt′) computed on
simulated data. As we clip the distance ρ a lot less agressively than before, ABCDP with smaller abc (red and
black dotted trace) performed better.
4. Experiments
4.1. Toy Examples
We start by investigating the interplay between abc
and dp = , in a simulated example where the ground
truth parameters are known. Following (Park et al.,
2016), we also consider a symmetric Dirichlet prior pi
and a likelihood p(y|θ) given by a mixture of uniform
distributions as
pi(θ) = Dirichlet(θ;1),
p(y|θ) =
5∑
i=1
θiUniform(y; [i− 1, i]). (17)
A vector of mixing proportions is our model pa-
rameters θ, where the ground truth is θ∗ =
[0.25, 0.04, 0.33, 0.04, 0.34]> (see Fig. 1). The goal
is to estimate E[θ|Y ∗] where Y ∗ is generated with θ∗.
We first generated 5000 samples for Y ∗ drawn from
eq. 17 with true parameters θ∗. Then we tested our
two ABCDP frameworks with varying abc and total.
In these experiments, we set ρ = M̂MD with a Gaus-
sian kernel. We set the bandwidth of the Gaussian
kernel using the median heuristic computed on the
simulated data (i.e., we did not use the real data for
this, hence there is no privacy violation in this regard).
For soft ABCDP, we drew 5000 pseudo-samples for Yt
at each time t. We show the result of our soft ABCDP
framework in Fig. 2.
returned by code and S is a scaling factor S = ∆ρ
abc
.
For rejection ABCDP, we drew 1000 pseudo-samples
for Yt at each time. Since the bound in eq. 11 depends
on the maximum of ρ denoted by Bρ, we pre-chose Bρ
to be either the top 5 or 20 percentile of the distances
ρ(Yt, Yt′) computed on simulated data. To ensure
that actual maximum of ρ(Y ∗, Yt) values during the
posterior sampling is indeed the pre-chosen values
of Bρ, we took the minimum between ρ(Y ∗, Yt) and
the pre-chosen Bρ. We show the result of rejection
ABCDP in Fig. 3. Note that we do not intend to
compare the results of private versions in Fig. 2 and in
Fig. 3, as this rejection ABCDP provides a pure DP
guarantee while soft ABCDP provides an approximate
DP with a failure probability 1-δtotal (where we set
δtotal = 10
−4).
4.2. Modelling Tuberculosis (TB) Outbreak
Using Stochastic Birth-Death Models
In this experiment, we used the stochastic birth-death
models to model Tuberculosis (TB) outbreak. The
observed data are the tuberculosis epidemic data from
San Francisco Bay area (Small et al., 1994).
There are four parameters that we aim to infer,
which go into the Communicable disease outbreak
simulator as inputs: burden rate β, transmission rate
t1, reproductive numbers R1 and R2. The goal is
to identify the approximate posterior distribution
p˜(R1, t1, R2, β|y∗) over these parameters given a set
of observations.
We used the same prior distributions for the four
7
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burden rate R1 R2 t1
prior
non-private
soft ABC
(eps_abc=20)
soft ABCDP
(eps_abc=20)
soft ABCDP
(eps_abc=80)
Figure 4: Histogram of the parameter samples for
the Tuberculosis (TB) outbreak model (Lintusaari
et al., 2019). 1st row: samples from the prior for
four different parameters (burden rate, R1, R2, and
t1). 2nd row: posterior samples from soft ABC with
abc = 20 (relatively small similarity threshold). The
resulting samples are well peaked around the posterior
mean. 3rd row: posterior samples from soft ABCDP
with abc = 20 with total = 4 and δtotal = 1e−4. At
this relatively generous privacy budget, due to the
moderate amount of noise, the posterior samples are
more spread than those in the non-private ABC. 4th
row: posterior samples from soft ABCDP with abc =
80 (relatively large similarity threshold) with total = 4
and δtotal = 1e−4. Even if abc is four times larger
than the 3rd row, the posterior samples exhibit similar
spread as those on the 3rd row, as the noise variance
gets smaller in this case. Our error measure also
indicates that the 3rd and 4th row produce posterior
samples that are similar in accuracy (see text).
parameters as in Lintusaari et al. (2019): β ∼
N (200, 30), R1 ∼ Unif(1.01, 20), R2 ∼ Unif(0.01, (1−
0.05R1)/0.95), t1 ∼ Unif(0.01, 30).
We also used the same set of summary statistic as in
(Lintusaari et al., 2019). See Appendix of (Lintusaari
et al., 2019) for the description on the 8-dimensional
summary statistic. So, for this dataset, we set ρ to be
the L2 distance between the chosen summary statistic
given the observed data and that given simulated
data. In this case, it is not clear how to analyze the
sensitivity of ρ. When sensitivity is unknown, one
could limit the sensitivity of ρ(Y ∗, Yt) by taking the
minimum between the evaluated distance ρ(Y ∗, Yt)
given Yt and a pre-chosen bound Bρ (this is precisely
the same case as in the rejection ABC experiment in
the earlier section). Once we ensure ρ(Y ∗, Yt) ≤ Bρ for
all t, we treat this maximum bound Bρ as a sensitivity
and tune the noise accordingly. We show the prior
and posterior samples obtained by soft ABC and soft
ABCDP in Fig. 4.
As an error metric, we also computed the mean ab-
solute distance between the posterior mean obtained
by (Lintusaari et al., 2019) and ours in all three cases
(2nd to 4th rows) shown in Fig. 4 assuming the pos-
terior mean obtained by (Lintusaari et al., 2019) to
be a ground truth. The errors averaged over 10 inde-
pendent runs are 3.10 for non-private soft ABC with
abc = 20 (2nd row in Fig. 4), 4.12 for soft ABCDP
with abc = 20 and total = 4 and δtotal = 1e−4 (3rd
row in Fig. 4), and 4.05 for soft ABCDP with abc = 20
and total = 4 and δtotal = 1e−4 (4th row in Fig. 4),
respectively.
5. Summary and Discussion
We presented two ABC algorithms that obey the no-
tion of differential privacy. The resulting posterior
samples are differentially private, either via releas-
ing differentially private binary indicators (rejection
ABC) or via releasing differentially private continuous
weights (soft ABC). In our rejection ABCDP algo-
rithm, we derived an upper bound for the privacy loss
that guarantees -DP, from which we can identify an
appropriate amount of noise to privatize the posterior
samples. In the second soft ABCDP algorithm, we
used the RDP notion to get a tight bound on the
privacy loss that guarantees (, δ)-DP. In each of these
algorithms, we focused on how the similarity threshold
abc plays a role in improving the privacy-accuracy
trade-off.
A natural by-product of ABCDP is differentially
private synthetic data generation. As the simulator
is a public tool that anybody can run and ABCDP
provides differentially private posterior samples for
simulator parameters, we can produce differentially
private synthetic data without paying any further pri-
vacy cost. Comparing our ABCDP framework with
other existing methods for differentially private syn-
thetic data generation would be an intriguing future
direction.
As a future direction, investigating an approximate
DP version of rejection ABCDP would be beneficial
to make the current framework more practical.
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Supplementary
A. Proof of Theorem 3.1
We first recall Theorem 3.1 stated in the main text:
Theorem 3.1 (Mrej is -DP). For any neighbouring datasets X,X ′ of size N and any dataset Y , assume
that ρ is such that 0 < sup(X,X′),Y |ρ(X,Y ) − ρ(X ′, Y )| ≤ ∆ρ < ∞. Assume that ρ is bounded by Bρ i.e.,
0 < supX,Y ρ(X,Y ) ≤ Bρ <∞ where X,Y are datasets of any size. Consider the mechanismMrej defined in
Def. 3.1. Define
h(σ) = min
(
1,
∆ρ√
2piσ2
) [
Φ
(
min(abc−Bρ,−abc)
σ
)]−1
, (11)
where Φ is the CDF of the standard normal. Given an , choose σrej = h−1() where h−1 is the inverse of h.
Then, the mechanism is -DP where  = h(σrej).
Proof. Recall thatMrej(Y ∗, Yt, abc, σ) = I
[
D˜(Y ∗, Yt) ≤ abc
]
= τt ∈ {0, 1} is the mechanism of the rejection
ABC that outputs a binary value indicating whether or not Yt is close to Y ∗, where
D˜(Y ∗, Yt) = ρ(Y ∗, Yt) + nt,
nt
i.i.d.∼ N (0, σ2) and we write σ for σrej . Here, I[·] denotes the Iverson bracket. For brevity, write D˜t :=
D˜(Y ∗, Yt) and ρ(Y ∗, Yt) = ρt. It follows that
D˜t ∼ N (ρt, σ2),
abc − D˜t ∼ N
(
abc − ρt, σ2
)
,
τt = I
[
abc − D˜t ≥ 0
]
implying that
τt ∼ Bernoulli (pt) ,
where pt = Φ
(
abc−ρt
σ
)
(i.e., the probability that abc − D˜t ≥ 0) and Φ is the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of the standard normal distribution.
To show thatMrej is -DP, we need to show that sup(Y ∗,Y ∗′ ) maxo∈{0,1}
∣∣∣∣ln P (Mrej(Y ∗,Yt,abc,σ)=o)P(Mrej(Y ∗′ ,Yt,abc,σ)=o)
∣∣∣∣ ≤  where
(Y ∗, Y ∗
′
) denotes a pair of neighbouring datasets. Let L(o) :=
∣∣∣∣ln P (Mrej(Y ∗,Yt,abc,σ)=o)P(Mrej(Y ∗′ ,Yt,abc,σ)=o)
∣∣∣∣. So, L(0) = ∣∣∣ln 1−pt1−p′t ∣∣∣
and L(1) =
∣∣∣ln ptp′t ∣∣∣. We have
max(L(0), L(1))
= max
(∣∣∣∣ln 1− pt1− p′t
∣∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣∣ln ptp′t
∣∣∣∣)
= max
(
− ln 1− pt
1− p′t
, ln
1− pt
1− p′t
,− ln pt
p′t
, ln
pt
p′t
)
= max
(
ln
1− p′t
1− pt , ln
1− pt
1− p′t
, ln
p′t
pt
, ln
pt
p′t
)
:= g(pt, p
′
t).
It can be seen that g is symmetric in its two arguments. Without loss of generality, assume that pt ≤ p′t. If this
is not true, simply swap the two variables to make this true. We have
0 ≤ g(pt, p′t) = max
(
ln
1− pt
1− p′t
, ln
p′t
pt
)
.
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Note that pt, p′t ∈
[
Φ
(
abc−Bρ
σ
)
,Φ
(
abc
σ
)]
:= D and that ln(x) is Lipschitz continuous on D with Lipschitz
constant LD:
LD = sup
x∈D
∣∣∣∣d lnxdx
∣∣∣∣ = sup
x∈D
∣∣∣∣ 1x
∣∣∣∣ = 1/Φ(abc −Bρσ
)
.
So,
ln
p′t
pt
= ln p′t − ln pt ≤
1
Φ
(
abc−Bρ
σ
) |p′t − pt|. (18)
Consider |p′t − pt|:
|p′t − pt|
=
∣∣∣∣Φ(abc − ρ′tσ
)
− Φ
(
abc − ρt
σ
)∣∣∣∣
= min
(
1,
∣∣∣∣Φ(abc − ρ′tσ
)
− Φ
(
abc − ρt
σ
)∣∣∣∣)
(a)
≤ min
(
1,
1√
2pi
∣∣∣∣abc − ρ′tσ − abc − ρtσ
∣∣∣∣)
= min
(
1,
1√
2piσ2
|ρ′t − ρt|
)
≤ min
(
1,
∆ρ√
2piσ2
)
, (19)
where at (a) we use the fact that x 7→ Φ(x) is 1√
2pi
-Lipschitz i.e., for any x, x′ ∈ R, |Φ(x)− Φ(x′)| ≤ 1√
2pi
|x−x′|.
Combining (18), and (19) , we have
sup
(Y ∗,Y ∗′ )
ln
p′t
pt
≤ min
(
1,
∆ρ√
2piσ2
)[
Φ
(
abc −Bρ
σ
)]−1
.
Using the same proof structure to bound ln 1−pt1−p′t , we have
sup
(Y ∗,Y ∗′ )
ln
1− pt
1− p′t
≤ min
(
1,
∆ρ√
2piσ2
)[
Φ
(
−abc
σ
)]−1
,
implying that
sup
(Y ∗,Y ∗′ )
max
(
ln
1− pt
1− p′t
ln
p′t
pt
)
≤ min
(
1,
∆ρ√
2piσ2
)[
Φ
(
1
σ
min (abc −Bρ,−abc)
)]−1
.
We have the stated result by setting the upper bound to .
B. Proof of Lemma 3.1
Recall Lemma 3.1 stated in the main text:
Lemma 3.1 (∆ρ = O(1/N) for MMD). Assume that Y ∗ and each pseudo dataset Yt are of the same cardinality
N . Set ρ(X,Y ) = M̂MD(X,Y ) with a kernel k bounded by Bk > 0 i.e., supx,y∈X k(x, y) ≤ Bk <∞. Then,
sup
(X,X′),Y
|ρ(X,Y )− ρ(X ′, Y )| ≤ ∆ρ = 2
N
√
Bk (12)
and supX,Y ρ(X,Y ) ≤ Bρ = 2
√
Bk.
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Proof. We will establish ∆ρ when ρ is MMD. Recall that (X,X ′) is a pair of neighbouring datasets, and Y is
an arbitrary dataset. Without loss of generality, assume that X = {x1, . . . , xN}, X ′ = {x′1, . . . , x′N} such that
xi = x
′
i for all i = 1, . . . , N − 1, and Y = {y1, . . . , ym}. We start with
sup
(X,X′),Y
|ρ(X,Y )− ρ(X ′, Y )|
= sup
(X,X′),Y
|M̂MD(X,Y )− M̂MD(X ′, Y )|
= sup
(X,X′),Y
∣∣∣∣ ∥∥∥∥ 1N
N∑
i=1
φ(xi)− 1
m
m∑
j=1
φ(yj)
∥∥∥∥
H
−
∥∥∥∥ 1N
N∑
i=1
φ(x′i)−
1
m
m∑
j=1
φ(yj)
∥∥∥∥
H
∣∣∣∣
(a)
≤ sup
(X,X′)
∥∥∥∥ 1N
N∑
i=1
φ(xi)− 1
N
N∑
i=1
φ(x′i)
∥∥∥∥
H
= sup
(xN ,x′N )
∥∥∥∥ 1N φ(xN )− 1N φ(x′N )
∥∥∥∥
H
= sup
(xN ,x′N )
1
N
√
k(xN , xN ) + k(x′N , x
′
N )− 2k(xN , x′N )
≤ 2
N
√
Bk,
where at (a) we use the reverse triangle inequality. To show that supX,Y ρ(X,Y ) = 2
√
Bk, we note that
sup
X,Y
ρ(X,Y )
≤ sup
X,Y
√√√√∥∥∥∥ 1N
N∑
i=1
φ(xi)− 1
m
m∑
i=1
φ(yi)
∥∥∥∥2
H
= sup
X,Y
√√√√ 1
N2
N∑
i,j=1
k(xi, xj) +
1
m2
m∑
i,j=1
k(yi, yj)− 2
mn
N∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
k(xi, yj)
=
√
Bk +Bk + 2Bk = 2
√
Bk.
C. MMD with Random Fourier Features
A fast linear MMD estimator can be achieved by considering an approximation to the kernel function k(x, y)
with an inner product of finite dimensional feature vectors φˆ(x)>φˆ(y) where φˆ(x) ∈ RD and D is the number
of features. Given the feature map φˆ(·) such that, k(x, y) ≈ φˆ(x)>φˆ(y), MMD2 can be approximated as
MMD2rf (Fx, Fy)
≈ EX φˆ(X)>EX′ φˆ(X ′) + EY φˆ(Y )>EY ′ φˆ(Y ′)
− 2EX φˆ(X)>EY φˆ(Y ) := ‖EX φˆ(X)− EY φˆ(Y )‖22.
A straightforward (biased) estimator is
M̂MD
2
rf (Fx, Fy) =
∥∥∥∥ 1nx
nx∑
i=1
φˆ(x(i))− 1
ny
ny∑
i=1
φˆ(y(i))
∥∥∥∥2
2
,
which can be computed in O(D(nx + ny)), i.e., linear in the sample size, leading to the overall cost of
O(MD(nx + ny)).
Given a kernel k, there are a number of ways to obtain φˆ(·) such that k(x, y) ≈ φˆ(x)>φˆ(y). One approach
which became popular in recent years is based on random Fourier features (Rahimi and Recht, 2008) which can
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be applied to any translation invariant kernel. Assume that k is translation invariant i.e., k(x, y) = k˜(x− y) for
some function k˜. According to Bochner’s theorem (Rudin, 2013), k˜ can be written as
k˜(x− y) =
∫
eiω
>(x−y) dΛ(ω) = Eω∼Λ cos(ω>(x− y))
= 2Eb∼U [0,2pi]Eω∼Λ cos(ω>x+ b) cos(ω>y + b),
where i =
√−1 and due to positive-definiteness of k˜, its Fourier transform Λ is nonnegative and can be
treated as a probability measure. By drawing random frequencies {ωi}Di=1 ∼ Λ and {bi}Di=1 ∼ U [0, 2pi],
k˜(x− y) can be approximated with a Monte Carlo average. It follows that φˆj(x) =
√
2/D cos(ω>j x+ bj) and
φˆ(x) = (φˆ1(x), . . . , φˆD(x))
>. Note that a Gaussian kernel k corresponds to normal distribution Λ.
D. Proof of Soft ABCDP
Here is the proof of Thm. 3.2.
Proof.
Dα
(
M(y∗, yt, abc, σsoft)||M(y′∗, yt, abc, σsoft)
)
= Dα(N (Dt, σ2soft)||N (D′t, σ2soft)),
=
α
2σ2soft
2
abc
(Dt −D′t)2, due to Corr. 2.1
≤ α
2σ2soft
2
abc
(|ρ(Yt, Y ∗)− ρ(Yt, Y ′∗)|)2 ,
if ρ = MMD, then due to the reverse triangle inequality
≤ α∆
2
ρ
2σ2soft
2
abc
(a)
=
2αBk
N2σ2soft
2
abc
,
where (a) is due to
∆φ = max
y∗,y′∗
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i φ(y
∗
i )
N
−
∑
i φ(y
′∗
i )
N
∣∣∣∣∣ (20)
= max
y∗i ,y
′∗
i
1
N
∣∣∣φ(y∗i )− φ(y′∗i )∣∣∣ ≤ 2√BkN , (21)
with a L2-norm bounded feature vector φ by
√
Bk (|φ(·)|2 ≤
√
Bk). Hence, following the definition of RDP, we
conclude that the soft-weight mechanism is (α, )-RDP, where  := 2αBk
N2σ2soft
2
abc
. Using Prop. 1, we can compute
the corresponding DP level.
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